





























                                                 





Of Ideas and Managers 
 
Typically we think that we own our ideas but really, they tend to own us. 
 
To have ideas is seen as distinctly human: H.G. Wells (1920) states that "Human history 
is in essence a history of ideas".  Management history can be depicted as a history of 
management ideas (Hamel, 2007). Ideas are generally thought as opinions, beliefs or 
convictions, intuitions or plans and schemes.
2 
 
A typical managerial representation of ideas is objects of aspiration or thought we can 
manipulate and create at will (e.g. Kelley, 2001, Dodgson et al, 2008).  They have an 
unfinished quality: in order to have (commercial or material) value, ideas need to be 
elaborated on and realized as products or activities. Ideas are thus commonly viewed as 
instruments in the hands of managers and organizations, and they are owned by these. 
Humans are in charge, they can adopt and jettison ideas on their discretion, and they can 
patent or copyright certain ideas. Even when ideas such as lean manufacturing or time 
management fundamentally shape management thinking and practice, ideas are seen as 
subservient to the managerial actor. A typical description of the relationship depicts the 
manager as the dominant partner and the idea only as the manager’s appliance. 
 
We see that disparagement unfair to ideas. In this paper we argue that there is value of 
seeing ideas as (more) equal to humans (see Figure 1). Ideas often control and affect 
managers deeply. Ideas shape organizational behavior and they tend to stick around 
(Stinchcombe, 1965).  Thus more appropriately, ideas can be seen as social entities in 
                                                 
2 a. In the philosophy of Plato, an archetype of which a corresponding being in phenomenal reality is an 
imperfect replica. 
b. In the philosophy of Kant, a concept of reason that is transcendent but nonempirical. 
c. In the philosophy of Hegel, absolute truth; the complete and ultimate product of reason. 
Source: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/idea  
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their own right. In this paper, we consider the perspective that it is ideas that tend to 
possess us rather than us that own ideas and thus can manipulate them at will, as to 
dispose of old bad ones, and create new hopefully innovative ones. We will argue that 
managers tend to be prisoners of some debunked idea that refuses to leave them, like 
Jevons and sun spots or Ricardo and the precise measure of value, as Stigler writes 
(1983:536). He draws attention to the difficulty of great economists to overcome certain 
non-productive ideas (like sun-spots having an impact on commercial cycles). World 
literature recounts multiple instances where the hero has become obsessed with a 
particular idea he cannot escape. Don Quixote in Cervantes’ great novel is a story of a 
man madly obsessed with the idea of a knighthood. Herman Melville’s Captain Ishmael 
is a tortured man, whose free will must be questioned and whose ability to fully 
command his actions is diminished. The idea of the white whale had possessed him. 
Similarly, many a manager has been unable to move beyond the existing strategy idea, 












We therefore contest the dominant view that ideas are as mere instrument for rational or 
innovative choice, for example as starters towards a successful decision making leading 
to a commercial end. A similar attitude to a related concept, information, is held by 
March and Sevón (1988) who write about idle talk first as a form of (useful) system 
maintenance but then confess that contrary to dominant thinking in decision theory, they 
believe there is value to information without decision relevance (they call such 
information gossip to stress its non-relevance to choice processes) simply because of our 
need to understand and interpret “what is going on in life”. However, gossip, not unlike 
ideas, has a life of its own that humans are rarely able to control. Thus perhaps ideas, not 
managers, have the upper hand in organizations. 
 
The view on ideas as primary relative to the human actor is not without precedent. 
Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Gene (1976) popularized the gene-centered 
view on evolution – selection acting at the level of genes rather than organisms – but also 
reintroduced the word ‘meme’
3 as a self-replicating unit of social evolution. Memes are 
like ideas that travel through diffusion but they are not typically seen as social entities 
that are able to change themselves and other entities they meet during their travels. Also 
the Scandinavian Institutional Theory (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, 2005) depicts ideas 
with the capability to travel. Ideas are also independent in that (unlike their human 
carriers) ‘they won’t go to jail’
4. 
 
In what follows, we wish to consider the role of ideas in managerial actions while giving 






                                                 
3 Historically, the notion of a unit of social evolution, and a similar term (from Greek mneme, meaning 
"memory"), first appeared in 1904 in a work by the German evolutionary biologist Richard Semon titled 
Die Mnemischen Empfindungen in ihren Beziehungen zu den Originalempfindungen (loosely translated as 
"Memory-feelings in relation to original feelings"). According to the OED, the word mneme appears in 
English in 1921 in L. Simon's translation of Semon's book: The Mneme. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meme 
4 This is a quote from a speech by A. Whitney Griswold in 1952.  
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Table 1. Toward a More Balanced Perspective of Ownership and Embodiment 
 
Humans rule over ideas: 
 
Humans elaborate ideas with an 
unfinished quality 
Humans use ideas as instruments 
Humans apply ideas to their own ends 
Humans are in charge; ideas are servant 
Humans can adopt and jettison ideas on 
their discretion 
Humans patent or copyright certain ideas 
 
Ideas rule over humans: 
 
Humans are trapped by ideas 
Ideas survive humans 
Ideas are stronger than humans 
Ideas take hold of humans 
Humans do (sometimes unexplainable) 
things in the name of ideas 
Ideas trample on the ”free will” of 
humans 
Ideas mark people as their own 
 
Humans embody ideas: 
 
Humans stand for an idea 
Humans seek expression of an idea in 
their behavior 
Humans use ideas to advance their 
careers or other life goals 
Humans seek consistency and meaning 
in ideas embodiment 
Humans dress to convey certain ideas 
Humans judge ideas and people who 
embody those ideas as good or bad 
Ideas embody humans: 
 
Humans become spokespersons for 
ideas 
Ideas take hold of humans 
Humans become symbols for ideas 
Ideas mascerade as humans 
Humans become possessed by ideas 





Our discussion includes an introduction of a specific role that makes the primacy of ideas 
as unusually discernible –that of a jester. We will propose the jester as a potential 
mediator between ideas and managers in their battle for primacy. First, however, we 
examine three notions that are pertinent to the relationship between ideas and managers 
and to the important role ideas play in managerial cognition.  
 
First notion: Ideas socialize. 
 
Ideas meet.  Ideas keep company and associate with other entities and as such, they are 
perceived as subjects: they meet other ideas or human actors. Some of their meetings we 
can trace via Google where we find several thousand hits for the phrase "ideas meet…” 
The hits reveal that ideas meet new and old ideas, and that they are active in different 
contexts. Ideas are active in the business world: they meet organisations, for example 
entrepreneurial ventures, they meet industry, and new technology. They also mingle with  
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the financial world, meet money and investors, and they meet presidents of important 
countries. Ideas fight at war and win over weapons. Hence, ideas are often described as 
independent actors, engaged in (inter)action. They thereby come into contact with human 
actors as well as their environments.  
 
However, even though ideas are pictures as actors above, we do not wish to claim any 
agency to them. Rather we wish to consider them as if they had a capacity to travel, meet, 
combine (mingle or unite) with other ideas or human actors, and change, succeed and 
fail, as apparently they do. In this view we keep company with authors such as 
Schumpeter (1939), Quadagno (1979), Nelson and Winter (1982:130), Henderson and 
Clark (1990), Hargadon and Sutton (1997). Legro (2000) wrote about collective ideas and 
the difficulty of explaining their success or failure at a particular time. Yet it is the notion 
of memes (Dawkins, 1976) that perhaps best allows the ideas their social character 
though even then, ideas (or memes) are merely units of behavioral imitation (see also 
Payne, Payne, and Doehlert, 1988) rather than social actors in their own right.  
 
Seemingly, ideas not only meet, they also travel. Czarniawska and Sevón (2005) claim 
that such travel trajectories of ideas can be fascinating. Ideas travel in time and space by 
adapting while maintaining their essential (recognizable) identity. In doing so, many 
ideas survive people and organizations. Holt (2008) tracked ideas for jokes across history 
and found that some of the same jokes are told in today’s Hollywood movies as in the 
middle ages! However, when management ideas travel in space they do so, according to 
Czarniawska and Joerges (1996), by being translated into objects (models, books, 
transparencies), then sent to other places than those where they emerged, then translated 
into new kind of objects, and then sometimes in actions, which, if repeated, might 
stabilize into institutions, which in turn could be described and summarized through 
abstract ideas, and so on and so forth (Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005:8).  
 
Ideas are traveling, through translations and simultaneous transformations, everywhere 
today globally. One example is reported by Pantzar (2008:25) who documented how 
Tapiola Garden City in Finland was built as a “suitable and beautiful environment for 
everyone”. The related design ideas, supported by humans, travelled from the US (e.g.  
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with Lewis Mumford) and Europe (e.g. with Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes) and 
gained their expression in the garden city that was visited and ideated by luminaries from 
all over the world as an example of ‘crime-free’ proper living environment.  
 
Second notion: We become our ideas, and ideas become us  
 
Such travelling of a human with an idea can be depicted as a traveler who is embodying 
an idea rather carrying the idea as an object in a suitcase. Yet, the traveller can equally be 
the idea that is embodied as a human. A well known example of an embodiment of an 
idea is the principle of liberty that was personified as a woman in a huge painting of a 
half naked woman by Eugène Delacroix in 1830 to commemorate the July Revolution in 
France the same year (Figure 2). Interesting is also the fact that the same painting is now 
seen as the symbol of the French revolution of 1789. The idea, by being embodied in a 









A jester is an illuminating example of an idea becoming a (live) human. The character of 
a jester has universal presence according to Otto (2001) – such fools are recorded 
throughout the history of Europe, China, India or the Middle East (as well as America 
and Africa). One becomes the jester by performing as the king’s fool. After many such 
performances, the jester will appear as a fool, and the idea of a fool can no longer be 
removed or separated. Thus becoming a jester is ‘a career-limiting move’ (sic!): Jesters 
can never become unfools again (nor kings).
5 Thus the kings can trust them because the 
past performance will constrain the jester’s future capacity to act other, potentially 
contradictory, ideas. Otto recounted multiple instances where fools suffer from 
overstepping their license and receive a punishment (sometimes death).  
 
Coser (1964) studied the political functions of eunuchism, not perhaps unlike a court 
jester in some regards. Also outcasts and rootless aliens with what is customarily viewed 
as irreversible physical handicap or at least incompleteness, Coser (1964) viewed 
eunuchs are reduced as human beings. Yet through this very humiliation, they become 
not only useful but also potentially powerful members of the court (for example the case 
of Chinese eunuchs, see Mitamura, 1963 as reviewed by Chang, 1965).  Similarly, the 
person playing or performing the jester is now bounded by the idea of a fool, drawing 
both power and constraint from the idea of foolness he (or occasionally she) embodies. 
For example, Will Sommers, the fool of king Henry the VIIIth, was an important member 
of the court (Otto, 2001).  
 
Thus it may be with women. After many gendered performances, we appear as our 
gender, or more specifically, we become the embodiment of the gender ideas that inhabit 
us (cf. Carlsen, 2008). These ideas can no longer be removed or separated, they have 
become our identity. The idea of a woman requiring a certain kind of performance is told 
by Mazzarella (2007) in her book Fredrika Runeberg. The social norms required for 
female writers at that time, in the late 19
th century, strict conformance to social 
expectations. In society, Ms. Runeberg could not become a writer, only a female writer at 
best. That is an example of the logic of appropriateness, the tendency to act in 
                                                 
5 There are a few exceptions amidst hundreds of fools recorded in history who have actually managed to 
become rulers themselves (Otto, 2001).  
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accordance with (or be defined by) the dominant social norms (Cyert and March, 1963)
6. 
A similar example is reported by by Burke and Reitzes (1981: 90-91) who studied the 
expression of certain identity dimensions or ideas such as Academic Responsibility in 
student behaviour. They conclude that “in order to be (some identity), one must act like 
(some identity). If being feminine, for example, means being tender and one defines 
oneself as being feminine, then one must act in ways that will be interpreted by oneself as 
well as by others as acting ‘tender’ and not acting ‘tough’.”  
 
Ideas are performed – and performing – in different drama genres that range from minor 
mimicry to major theater. We can see increasing interest in such performances where 
ideas become people but people also become ideas. For example, there is a fascination 
with reality TV that shows ordinary people often in dramatic circumstances. Ordinary 
people become hero personalities, actors in their own right. There is a lot of drama, and a 
remarkably vague borderline between what is perceived as real and what is seen as 
fantasy. Movies may influence our perception of reality too. Californians have even 
elected a movie action hero as their governor! Others would rather be treated by the actor 
playing doctor in the well-known TV series ER, than a real MD at the local hospital 
(according to a newspaper survey). And the TV public suffers with the employees under 
their pathetic boss in the English soap opera Office. Such public drama performances 
shape other people’s perception of who we are and what we are capable of. People may 
use such almost realistic shows as social norms in their choices according to the logic of 
appropriateness.  
 
However, there is a risk of acting out a ‘wrong’ or contextually inappropriate idea. In the 
case of the Opportunity Discovery Department at AT&T, Muller and Valikangas (2003) 
recount the many creative ways in which the “ODDsters” – as the group was called – 
contributed ideas, language, and humor to the strategy making of AT&T in an effort to 
revitalize the slowly stalling juggernaut. Their ideas shaped AT&T strategy, for example, 
in a form of an ODDster-produced strategy document that was discussed by AT&T’s 
Board  (see also Wood and Valikangas, 2008).  AT&T’s ODDsters were evaluated, 
                                                 
6 Not many researchers have discovered that the logic of appropriateness is an early model of the process 
of social construction, appearing already in 1963,  
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however, in the end on their patent activity – as scientists from Bell Labs, they were 
supposed to do patentable research (Muller & Valikangas, 2003). Their protest that they 
had been working on AT&T’s strategy received no sympathy: the strategy was formally 
the job of a CEO, and therefore, by definition, a group of ODDsters could not have 
contributed to it. They had thus not confirmed to the perceived idea of their performance, 
and therefore not performed (or performed poorly) as researchers in the Bell Labs even 
though their performance as AT&T employees was remarkable. Their performance did 




Figure 3. CEO, the Beaten Boxer. 
 
A CEO, too, must exercise care in the idea he or she is seen to perform. As a company’s 
public face, the CEO must embody the idea of success and communicate belief in their 
company´s future achievements.  Interest groups, including the press, may interpret the 
personal appearance of a manager as an indicator of company fortunes. Such embodied 
performances may then have a substancial effect on the company´s market value. One 
such example, described by Sevón (2003) concerned a former CEO of the Swedish  
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telecom company Ericsson who, after presenting a positive quarterly report in 2003, was 
depicted by the local massmedia looking like “a defeated boxer” (signaling a lack of faith 
in the company future) (see Figure 3), which, according to the newpapers influenced the 
price of company shares negatively.  
 
Third notion: Ideas escape 
 
Despite our intellectual freedom, we may become mental prisoners of our ideas but the 
opposite is not possible: We cannot keep ideas in prison.  Illustratory of the human 
dilemma is a statement by a well-known management author who lamented the difficulty 
of “escaping one’s past ideas”. Viewing himself a prisoner, his past published ideas had 
devoured him: they limited his ability to imagine or credibly present new, different ideas. 
Similarly, among managers and politicians it is common to experience that the success of 
the past is a hinder for a different future (Kets de Vries, 1989). Winston Churchill was 
not re-elected despite having won the Second World War, presumably because he 
symbolized the hardships, and people needed relief and joy in their exhaustion (e.g. 
Jenkins, 2001). 
 
Also managers may have difficulty in moving beyond their past. Their idea performances 
may determine the capacity to take (credible) action in the future: A CEO, who bet the 
company on a particular strategy and failed, rarely has another opportunity to set a new 
course. As one CEO described it: “You can be wrong, and it is even a good thing to be a 
little wrong once and a while, but you cannot be totally off”.
7 This in part explains why 
many people/managers have such trouble admitting they were wrong: it would not do 
much career good as they cannot escape these fallen ideas. Self -justification is one 
proposed reason for such continued and escalated commitment (Brockner, 1992).  
 
However, even if managers, and people cannot, ideas do escape. That ideas get out of 
control of people and organizations, that ideas take their own routes, change with context 
and those they meet has consequences.  Authors, for example, cannot control their ideas 
                                                 
7 Regarding the business focus on stainless steel (as the strategy idea).  
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even if they wanted to. Perhaps one of most well-known examples is Thomas Kuhn’s 
attempt to intervene in the wide usage of the word ‘paradigm’, as it had become 
meaningless in his view.
 8His insistent intervention to stop the practice however entirely 
failed. Invoking Kuhn had become “like a talisman” (see Fuller, 1988), and he was 
unable to control its usage. As Melian (2007) has described, open source-inspired 
systems are built on the very notion that ideas “like to be free” – they travel from one 
person to another, from one context to another, and gain different expressions and 
combinations. 
 
Griswold said in a speech that “ideas won’t go to jail”. However, they may get people in 
jail. An editor of a Hungarian humor magazine is attributed a remark that “Telling a joke 
is more interesting when you can go to jail for it” (Otto, 2001:135). It is playing with fire 
that makes wit interesting. Ideas, like jokes, can get out of control and not only the 
person’s mind but also the body may become imprisoned. Perhaps then, it is not 
surprising, that defense mechanisms have evolved to defend humans against the power of 
ideas. 
 




We have here argued for a perspective where ideas are much more persuasive than 
commonly held. We have claimed that ideas are powerful actors in the managerial 
environment. Managers, and humans more generally, occasionally become imprisoned by 
the idea of personal success, for example, exhibiting strong cognitive inertia even when 
faced with the necessity of change (Kets de Vries, 1990; Tripsas et al, 2000). Signs of 
ideas ruling over managers include such persistence with obsolete strategies or 
competitive notions (Barr et al, 1992), an obsession with a particular (faddish) 
management technique, such as TQM (Backstrom, 1999), and the act of engaging in 
gross misbehavior or brutality in the name of an idea or a cause (cf. Huntington, 1998). 
                                                 
8 The presentation by Oliver Ratle on ”Boundary-Work in Organisation Studies: A Framework and 
Application, Helsinki School of Economics, 19.9.2008  
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We suggest a jester is a unique social institution that evolved to help humans cope with 
the ideas that refuse to leave them. A jester is a tradition dating back to medieval times 
that counterbalances, as one of its important functions, the power that ideas hold through 
a unique privilege, the freedom of (humorous and witty) speech. This freedom was 
gained as anything that a jester would say was “in jest” or an “utterance of a fool”, thus 
seemingly discounted (yet still effective). A fool has many names: buffoon, clown, 
minstrel.
9 Klapp wrote in 1949 that  
 
“the fool is a symbol of fundamental importance, representing a role especially 
valued by the group. The fool is a social type found widely in folklore, literature 
and drama.” (p.157).  
 
We suggest that jesters mediate the battle of power between ideas and humans (and this is 
one of the reasons for its universal prominence as an institution in human history). The 
mediation is particularly visible in the case of court jesters and kings. To be able to jester, 
the first step is to remind the king of the fragility of his position. The jester “…becomes 
the person who through various means reminds the leader of the transience of power. He 
becomes the guardian of reality, and in a paradoxical way, prevents the pursuit of foolish 
action” (Kets de Vries, 1990:757). The jester is thus a useful antidote for the persuasions 
of power that tend, over time, to diminish a person’s ability to judge his/her own 
performance and capabilities objectively (Kets de Vries, 2003).  
 
Thus it is in companies also. The role of the jester, first and foremost, implies the right 
and skill to make people to see themselves and their actions more clearly. Paul Birch, 
now a former British Airways’ corporate jester, is quoted as saying: “Fools pinpoint 
absurdity by acting out the absurd. They act as a mirror in which people see their 
mistakes without having to admit to them. This enables Fools to challenge accepted 
wisdom and create new alternatives. As such, they’re entrusted with the sensitive task of 
managing and controlling change.”
10  A jester can thus be a key player, the master 
                                                 
9 Also harlequin, jongleur, fou, narr, stultor, scurra…and more. 
10 http://idler.co.uk/features/you-have-to-be-mad-to-work-here/  
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interpreter, in the power struggle for the definition of the firm’s strategy, for example. 
Kaplan (2004) has documented strategy making as such a framing contest – a battle of 
whose view will prevail in directing the firm’s future. However, the function of a jester, 
and that of humor more generally, a likely aid to such contesting and familiar in the 
courts of kings, is not visible in academic discussions of corporate strategy making. 
 
A jester may be a role, played by someone like Paul Birch at British Airways or it can be 
the frequent collective referencing to a cartoon like Adam Scott’s Dilbert in corporate 
presentations. A jester may be an outside consultant too. But jestering is an important 
social institution we should recognize. Many people we have talked with claim 
themselves as jesters in corporate life. Thus we should include jestership in our accounts 
of organizations and leadership. Not only because such jestery is probably common but 
also because of its distinct benefits, as we have argued in this paper, as one of the few 
defense mechanisms humans, and managers, have against the power of possessive, 
sometimes obsolete, ideas. 
 
A jester’s ability to mediate between ideas and humans stems from the privileges of being 
a fool (Otto, 2001). Only fools (and perhaps children as in emperor’s missing clothes) can 
be forgiven the unique privilege, without demolishing the social order, to point out the 
(too) obvious, the forbidden, and the partially hidden. To make the ideas that embody us 
and that we perform, sometimes unknowingly, visible. A jester facilitates the undressing 
of such mascarades. A good jester’s wit then also serves as a lubricant to the reckoning.  
The nakedness that would be rejected off-hand, were it not coated with humor, now 
becomes more palatable. There is less denial. And the hold of ideas on us diminishes with 
laughing at ourselves.  
 
The humorous absurdity or incongruity of it all eventually shifts perceptions (Polimeni & 
Reiss, 2006). “The fool breaks down the boundary between chaos and order, but he also 
violates our assumptions that the boundary was where we thought it was and that it had 
the character we thought it had. “ (Willeford, 1969:39). The jester may thus aid the 
accomplishment of cognitive innovation – a breakthrough or a break-out of the ideas that 
normally characterize or dominate our thinking. This breaking out of ideas can be  
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collective too: The use of humor has been found helpful in navigating contentious 
situations in corporations (Hatch, 1997) while shared laughter communicates ease or non-
threat (Ramachandran, 1998).  
 
A jester can be a potentially powerful agent of change, enhancing the organizational 
ability to escape obsolete or misguided ideas and absurd orthodoxies.  Of course, jesters 
can also work toward maintaining the status quo. A jester can act as a social controller, 
by ridiculing those who profess heresy or are oursiders (Klapp, 1962). So choose your 
jesters carefully, so that they too will not become possessed by the undue persuations of 
too powerful ideas.  Humanity’s actions can sometimes be unexplicable in their dark 
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